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 Introduction 
 
The promotion of the manufacturing sector and its exports has been a key pillar of the 
growth strategy employed by successful developing countries, especially labor abundant ones. In 
this context, India's recent growth experience is puzzling on two accounts. First, while India's 
economy has grown rapidly over the last two decades the growth momentum has not been based 
on manufacturing. Rather the main contributor to growth has been the services sector. Second, 
the relatively lackluster performance of Indian manufacturing cannot be ascribed to a lack of 
policy initiatives to jumpstart the sector. India introduced substantial product market reforms in 
its manufacturing sector starting in the mid-1980s, but the sector never took off as it did in other 
high-growth countries. Moreover, in so far as subsectors within manufacturing have performed 
well, these have been the relatively capital- or skill-intensive industries, not the labor-intensive 
ones as would be expected for a labor abundant country like India.
2  
 
One of the main components of reforms in India was the liberalization of the industrial 
licensing regime, or ―delicensing‖. Under the Industries Development and Regulatory Act of 
1951 every investor over a very small size needed to obtain a license before establishing an 
industrial plant, adding a new product line to an existing plant, substantially expanding output, or 
changing a plant‘s location. Over time, many economists and policymakers began to view the 
licensing regime as generating inefficiencies and rigidities that were holding back Indian 
industry.  The process of delicensing started in 1985 with the dismantling of industrial licensing 
requirements for a group of manufacturing industries. Delicensing reforms accelerated in 1991, 
                                                           
2 See Kochhar et al (2006).   3 
and by the late 1990s virtually all industries had been delicensed. Large payoffs were expected in 
the form of higher growth and employment generation with this policy reform.   
 
However, the payoffs till date have been limited. It can be argued that a lag between the 
announcement and implementation of the policy, and also a lag between implementation and the 
payoffs may be responsible. However, it has been as many as twenty years since the first batch 
of industries was delicensed and almost a decade since the last batch of industries was 
delicensed; the view that payoffs would occur with a lag is difficult to maintain.
3   
 
What then could be the reasons for the rather lackluster performance of the industrial 
sector? The following factors are usually offered: (i) strict labor laws have hindered growth, 
especially of labor intensive industries (see Krueger, 2007; Panagariya, 2006; Panagariya, 2008); 
(ii) infrastructure bottlenecks have prevented industries from taking advantage of the reforms; 
and (iii) credit constraints due to weaknesses in the financial sector may be holding back small 
and medium sized firms from expanding (see Banerjee and Duflo, 2008; Nagaraj, 2002; 
McKinsey Global Institute, 2006). More recently, two other factors have also been raised. First, 
it has been pointed out that the evolution of Indian industry may be influenced by path 
dependence or hysteresis so that despite the reforms of the mid-1980s and early 1990s, the 
relative profitability of capital-and skill-intensive activities remains higher than that of labor-
intensive activities (Kochhar et al, 2006). Second, the major reform initiatives undertaken so far -
- focused mainly on product market reforms -- have been national ones. However, the working of 
                                                           
3 There have been two other major reforms in the Indian industrial sector—trade reforms and the 
abolition of policies which reserved certain sectors for small scale industries. We plan to 
examine these in future work.    4 
product markets in a federal democracy such as India is influenced not only by regulations 
enacted by the central government, but also those enacted by individual state governments. 
Moreover, much of the authority on administration and enforcement of regulation also rests with 
state governments. Accordingly, it has been pointed out that regulatory and administrative 
bottlenecks at the state level may be blunting the impact of reforms undertaken at the central 
level (OECD, 2007). 
 
Even though the foregoing factors have been debated actively in academic and policy 
circles, the empirical evidence to support or negate these arguments is limited. Two prominent 
exceptions include Besley and Burgess (2004) and Aghion et al (2006). These papers have 
primarily looked at the effect that labor regulations have had on industrial growth in India using 
state-level amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) to classify states as pro-worker, 
neutral, or pro-employer. While the first finds that industrial performance has been weaker in 
Indian states with pro-worker labor laws, the second finds states with pro-worker labor laws to 
have experienced limited benefits from delicensing reforms.  
 
But these findings have been contested. First, it has been argued that the entire burden of 
regulatory weaknesses that might be constraining Indian manufacturing is placed on labor. In 
particular, neither of the papers accounts for other regulatory weaknesses. Second, the coding of 
state-level amendments to the IDA as pro-worker, neutral, or pro-employer has been criticized 
(see, especially, Bhattacharjea, 2006). 
   5 
In this paper, we attempt to address both of the criticisms. Thus, while this paper analyzes 
the impact of delicensing on industrial performance, as in Aghion et al, we pay attention to the 
role of factors other than just labor regulations in influencing industrial performance. In 
particular, we look at how weaknesses in infrastructure and cumbersome product market 
regulations at the state level may be affecting India's manufacturing sector.   
 
Additionally, we deal with the criticism surrounding Besley and Burgess‘ coding of state-
level labor regulations, and thus the robustness of their result that pro-worker labor regulations 
have undermined industrial performance, in two ways.  First, we consider an alternative 
approach for classifying states‘ stance on labor regulations drawing upon the work of 
Bhattacharjea (2008) and OECD (2007) in addition to that of Besley and Burgess. Second, we 
consider an altogether different approach for identifying the impact of labor regulations on 
industrial performance. Instead of relying solely on cross-state heterogeneity in labor regulations, 
we rely on heterogeneity in industry-specific characteristics as well. In particular, to the extent 
that rigidities introduced by labor regulations are likely to have their greatest bite on labor-
intensive industries, the performance of labor-intensive industries can be expected to be weaker 
than others, especially in states with pro-worker or inflexible labor regulations.  
 
In this way, our empirical work attempts to answer the following questions in a way that 
builds upon the recent literature: Does the impact of policy reform vary across industries? Does 
the impact depend on the state specific regulatory framework governing not only labor issues but 
also product market regulations? Does infrastructure play a role in determining the payoffs from 
reforms? Could hysteresis be one reason behind the modest payoffs from reforms? We use state   6 
level data on registered manufacturing  published by the Annual Survey of Industry (ASI) at the 
three digit level from 1980-2004 to answer these questions. This data is used along with a host of 
other data pertaining to industry and state level characteristics of various kinds. The main 
findings of the paper are as follows.   
 
(1) The impact of delicensing has been highly uneven across industries.  Industries which 
are labor intensive and/or depend on infrastructure (or are energy dependent)  have experienced 
smaller gains from reforms.   
 
(2) Regulation at the state level matters. States with less competitive product market 
regulations have experienced slower growth in the industrial sector post-delicensing, as 
compared to states with competitive product market regulations. States with  relatively inflexible 
labor regulations have experienced slower growth of labor-intensive industries and slower 
employment growth. 
 
(3) Infrastructure availability and financial sector development are important 
determinants of the benefits that accrued to states from reforms.  Where supportive regulatory 
conditions prevailed and infrastructure was available, businesses responded by expanding their 
capacity and grew, and to that extent hysteresis does not seem to matter. 
 
It is useful to note some features of our work that can help put our findings in a broader 
context.  First, our analysis is limited to India‘s registered manufacturing, or in other words, the 
formal manufacturing sector. As is the case in other developing countries, India's manufacturing   7 
sector is characterized by a duality.
4  While registered manufacturing accounts for a very large 
share of total manufacturing value added in India, its share of employment is quite low.  For 
example, registered manufacturing accounted for almost two-thirds of total manufacturing value 
added in India and only around 20 percent of employment in 2000-01.
5 Given that so much of 
manufacturing employment is in the unorganized sector, an understanding of how economic 
reforms have affected the sector is clearly a matter of considerable importance.  A lack of 
comparable annual data on the unorganized sector makes it difficult to study it along with the 
registered sector, however, and we follow previous literature by focusing on the registered 
sector.  We do not consider this to be a serious limitation of our work. On average, firms in the 
formal sector can be expected to be more productive, pay higher wages, and provide better 
working conditions than firms in the informal sector. Indeed, from the perspective of economic 
development, one would want to see the formal sector expanding at the expense of the informal 
sector.  If output and/or employment in the formal sector are growing slowly, we would like to 
know why and what can be done about it. Thus from several points of view, including the 
welfare of workers, the performance of the formal sector is important to monitor and analyze.
6  
                                                           
4 The registered, or formal manufacturing sector includes all manufacturing establishments that 
employ either 10 or more workers using power or 20 or more workers without using power and 
which are registered under the Factories Act, 1948.  Data pertaining to the registered 
manufacturing sector are collected annually through the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI).   All 
remaining manufacturing establishments belong to the unregistered, or informal manufacturing 
sector.  A key source of data on unregistered establishments, also known as unorganized sector 
establishments, is the National Sample Survey Organization‘s (NSSO) survey of the unorganized 
sector carried out approximately every five years. 
5 See Bosworth, Collins and Virmani (2007), for issues related to employment data in India. 
 
6 A caveat to this reasoning is as follows.  It has been pointed out by several analysts that the 
survey frame of the ASI has been deteriorating steadily over the last 10 to 15 years (see, for 
example, Manna 2008).  A specific manifestation of this deterioration is that the ASI  may not be 
picking up information from a number of smaller establishments as well as it used to.  If the   8 
   
Second, the unit of analysis in this paper is industry level data (by state).   It can be 
argued that analysis would be more appropriate at the firm level or the factory level data.  
However, there are some important drawbacks in using available micro data, such as the firm-
level Prowess database published by the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) and 
ASI unit  (factory) level data. The Prowess data is available only since the early 1990s for listed 
firms, with poorer coverage in the earlier years of the data. In addition, it lacks information on 
employment, and the state in which the firm operates, thus rendering it virtually useless for our 
exercise. As for ASI factory level data, data are not available as a continuous time-series 
covering the period of interest.   Moreover, extensive discussions with researchers working with 
this data convinced us that building a panel dataset is exceedingly difficult.  In view of these 
limitations we settled for the ASI industry level data for our analysis. 
7 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
smaller establishments tend to be labor-intensive, or are to be found in states which are coded by 
us as having inflexible labor market regulations, it is possible that our results based on ASI data 
may be biased.  Thus, for example, when we find employment growth to be lower post-
delicensing in labor-intensive industries, this result may reflect the fact that employment in 
labor-intensive industries is increasingly being generated by smaller establishments that are 
missing from the ASI frame.  Results from our research using data from unregistered 
manufacturing from 1994, 2000, and 2005 suggests that any deterioration in the ASI frame on 
account of under coverage of establishments is not systematic in a way that biases the results we 
get in this paper.  For example, treating all unregistered manufacturing establishments with 10 or 
more workers as establishments that should have been covered by the ASI, we find no 
statistically significant differences in trend growth of employment, output, or value-added across 
labor- and nonlabor-intensive industries.  Similarly, we find no statistically significant 
differences in trend growth across states based on their labor market regulations.  These results 
hold even when we limit our attention to unregistered manufacturing establishments with 20 or 
more workers.   
7 The terms plants and factories are often used interchangeably in the literature and refer to the 
actual premises where manufacturing activity is carried out. A firm on the other hand refers takes 
into account ownership. A firm may have several factories operating under its ownership.   9 
 
Third, we do not consider reforms other than delicensing in the paper. Several other 
major reforms have been introduced in so far as Indian manufacturing is concerned, including 
reductions in barriers to trade and the dismantling of the policy of reserving particular industries 
for production by the small-scale sector.  On a similar note, an important element of the post-
reform economic landscape in India has been the opening up of the economy to foreign direct 
investment. It is indeed an important development and is likely to have affected industrial 
performance. However, studying its impact separately is beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
Finally, regulations can affect firms and industries in many different ways. For example, 
they may create incentives for firms to operate in the informal sector, stay relatively small, or 
adopt particular types of techniques. While the analysis of aggregate data can shed (indirect) 
light on some of these effects, a more complete analysis would require the use of a micro-based 
approach utilizing plant level data, ideally from both the formal and informal sectors.  This type 
of analysis is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, though we plan to tackle this in future 
work.
8   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we highlight the performance 
of the industrial sector in India, including the heterogeneity in the industrial performance across 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Industry is defined here as the aggregate of plants/factories proucing similar goods (using NIC 
classficiation). 
8 As may be inferred from the discussion above, such analysis will have to be limited to only a 
few years spaced roughly 5 years apart (on account of the fact that plant level data on informal 
sector firms cannot be obtained on an annual basis).  Further, such analysis would not be able to 
take account of plant fixed effects (on account of the fact that plant identities cannot be known).   10 
industrial sectors and the regional variation in industrial growth. In section III we discuss the 
econometric methodology and the sources of data used in the paper. In Section IV we present 
and discuss our results. Section V concludes.  
 
II. Performance of the Indian (Registered) Manufacturing Sector 
 
The Indian growth process in the past fifteen years (and some would argue in the entire 
post-independence period) has been rather lopsided. Indian growth has been more about services 
rather than industries. There have been modest payoffs to reforms in the industrial sector. This is 
despite the fact that the liberalization efforts were focused mostly on improving the regulatory 
environment faced by the industrial sector and reducing trade protection. Within industry, labor 
intensive sectors have gained much less from reforms than the capital intensive sectors. Growth 
has also been uneven at the regional level. Certain states—with higher per capita income and 
higher initial share of industry – have done better than the rest. Let us first look at this 
heterogeneity in Indian industrial sector. 
 
Indian Growth Momentum is about Services 
 
  As has been documented in Gordon and Gupta (2004), the services sector has been the 
largest contributor to economic growth in India, and with services sector growth accelerating 
further in the post-liberalization period, its share in GDP and contribution to growth has been 
increasing. As Figure 1 shows it has contributed almost two-thirds of GDP growth in India in 
recent years and currently constitutes close to 55 percent of GDP.    11 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Modest and Unstable pick up in Industrial Performance post-delicensing 
 
The growth of manufacturing value added has not necessarily accelerated in the post-
delicensing period.
9 The aggregate value added in registered manufacturing has increased from 
about Rs 2.8 billion in 1980 to Rs 16.4 billion in 2004 (as measured in 1993-94 prices), which 
translates into 5.6 percent a year average growth rate in the sample period, with value added 
growing by an additional 15 percent between 1993 and 2004 (i.e. a little more than 1 percent a 
year). This modest pickup in value added has not been accompanied by additional growth in 
employment or in the number of factories.
10,11 As Panel B in Figure 2 shows, employment, of 
blue collared workers as well as total employment stagnated in the mid nineties and subsequently 
declined until about early 2000s, and experienced a modest pick up in recent years. When we 
compare this performance with the pace of growth in the manufacturing sector of many East 
                                                           
9 The performance in the post-delicensing period has also not been consistent. It has been marked 
by a sharp deceleration from 1996 to 2001 when the average annual growth rate dipped to 3 
percent, from 11 percent a year in 1991-1996, and a recovery in the ensuing period when the 
industrial growth recovered to an average 10 percent a year over the period 2001 to 2006 as per 
the CSO data. 
10 As highlighted in Gupta, Hasan and Kumar (2008), performance varies across different 
sectors: the industries which depend more on infrastructure on average experienced lower growth 
in value added post-delicensing, as compared to the industries which are less reliant on 
infrastructure. Similarly, the industries more dependent on the financial sector or the labor 
intensive industries have fared much worse than the industries that do not rely as much on the 
financial sector and capital intensive industries. 
11 As per the Factories Act, 1948, a factory refers to any premises where 10 or more workers are 
working when the manufacturing process is carried on with the aid of power; or where 20 or 
more workers are working and the manufacturing process is carried on without the use of power.   12 
Asian countries including China, we realize that, especially in terms of value added, the 
performance of Indian manufacturing has not been close to that of East Asian countries. For 
example, manufacturing value added in South Korea grew at an average annual real growth rate 
of approximately 17 percent between 1960-1980; and China‘s manufacturing sector grew at an 
average rate of 12 percent per year between 1990-2005. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
In addition we note below that the performance has been uneven across states and 
industries. As can be seen from Figure 3 below, there has been a divergence in the performance 
of the labor intensive and capital intensive industries in India. The labor intensive industries have 
grown relatively slowly post-delicensing. Different panels below depict the industrial sector 
growth across different industries and across states characterized by different regulatory 
framework, and different infrastructural developments. First, in Panel A, we see that the 
industrial performance is similar across states with different labor market regulations; in Panel B 
we see that industrial output grew faster in states with competitive product market regulations 
post delicensing. Industrial performance is also seen to be better in states with more developed 
infrastructure or more developed financial sector in the next two panels. As can be seen in Panel 
E below the growth seems to be broadly similar in labor intensive and capital intensive industries 
before the liberalization, but has accelerated in the capital intensive industries, post-delicensing. 
Finally the last two panels show that the performance of labor intensive industries is in particular 
better in the states with labor regulations that are considered to be flexible (pro employer). 
   13 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
III.  Data and Methodology 
 
Our analysis is based on the ASI data for 42 three-digit manufacturing industries for the 
period 1980-2004 for 15 major states of India.  As mentioned earlier, we capture only registered 
manufacturing in our analysis using this data. We utilize variation in industry and state 
characteristics in order to identify how factors such as labor regulations, product market 
regulations, availability of physical infrastructure, and financial sector development may have 
influenced the impact of delicensing on industrial performance.  Our measures of industrial 
performance include gross value added, gross value of output, employment and number of 
factories. Definitions of these variables are provided in Appendix A. Below we discuss 
methodological issues in more detail, including how we measure delicensing and pertinent 
industry- and state-specific characteristics for our econometric analysis. 
 
Delicensing, Industry Characteristics, and State Characteristics 
 
Delicensing: From the early-1950s up until the early-1980s the evolution of India's 
manufacturing sector was guided by industrial and trade policies that protected domestic industry 
and gave the state a central role in investment decisions. While a strict regime of import and 
export controls defined trade policy, industrial policy worked through an elaborate system of 
industrial licensing. Under the Industries Development and Regulatory Act of 1951 every 
investor over a very small size needed to obtain a license before establishing an industrial plant,   14 
adding a new product line to an existing plant, substantially expanding output, or changing a 
plant‘s location.     
 
Industrial stagnation since the mid-1960s – increasingly blamed on the policy framework 
– led to some tentative steps aimed at liberalizing these regimes in the late 1970s and early-1980s 
(see Ahluwalia, 1987, 1991). Relaxations of the industrial licensing system were introduced and 
import licensing requirements were eased. Serious liberalization efforts began in 1985 with 
delicensing—the exemption from the requirement of obtaining an industrial license—of 25 broad 
categories of industries, which map into 13 industries in our three digit level data. The next 
major reform of the licensing regime came in 1991 when industrial licensing was abolished 
except in the case of a small number of industries (see Figure 4 and Appendix B for the time path 
of delicensing).  
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
 
Thus delicensing is one of the most comprehensive reform programs undertaken by the 
Government of India and this is the reform variable that we work with. Information on it is also 
readily available (see Aghion et al, 2006; Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar, 2008). Additionally, there is 
good reason to believe that the specific timing of delicensing of particular industries was 
unanticipated by firms. Further, it is unlikely that the industries that were delicensed were chosen 
on the basis of expected future performance (see Aghion et al, 2006). In other words, delicensing 
represented an unanticipated reform, and also a reform measure that is unlikely to be subject to   15 
endogeneity concerns. To the extent that implementation of delicensing may have lagged its 
announcement, we lag the date of delicensing by a year.
12  
 
Industry characteristics: For technological reasons, industries need different inputs in 
different combinations, with specific industries often relying more heavily on certain inputs.  For 
example, some industries may rely more on labor, some on skilled labor, and some may make 
more extensive use of physical infrastructure such as roads, electricity, ports etc. As a result, the 
size and growth of industries can be expected to depend on the cost and availability of inputs that 
are used most intensively in their production. Here, we look at industries which are labor 
intensive, unskilled labor-intensive, spend more heavily on energy and other infrastructure, or 
export a larger share of their total output, and examine whether the payoffs from reforms differ 
across these industries. If industries requiring a certain input have gained less from reforms, it 
could be because of the limited availability of that input and/or its price being too high.
13  
 
For example, if industries dependent on infrastructure have not grown much post-
reforms, it may well be on account of the unavailability of adequate infrastructure. A similar 
finding for labor intensive industries would be hard to reconcile in the same way, however. 
Given the large size of India's labor force and the level of wages, a more natural explanation for 
the relatively weak performance of labor intensive industries could lie in appealing to issues such 
                                                           
12 As mentioned earlier studying the impact of other important policy reforms, such as trade 
reforms or delisting of industries from the ambit of the small scale industry reservation policy is 
beyond the scope of this paper. We, however, plan to analyze the impact of these policy reforms 
in our future work. 
13 We are presuming, of course, that the production of these goods is not constrained by 
inadequate demand, but due to supply-side constraints imposed on their growth. 
   16 
as the quality of labor and/or regulations on employment which make the effective price of 
hiring labor too high. 
 
We construct indicators of industries‘ reliance on labor and infrastructure inputs using 
data from several different databases for Indian industries and Indian firms, as well as using data 
for the US. The idea behind using the latter is that input needs are sufficiently technical in nature 
and specific to an industry (or a small group of industries), and not to countries. Also, the 
relative need of industries of various inputs is unlikely to change over time.  Thus, for example, 
while all industries may be becoming more capital-intensive over time, the set of industries that 




In order to get around the concern that these input related industry characteristics would 
reflect the equilibrium conditions between the demand and supply of the respective inputs, we 
use data from an earlier year rather than contemporaneous data. Furthermore, to smooth out the 
                                                           
14 For all industrial characteristics (except skill intensity) we have used different databases 
for India. Since this could be subject to the criticism that it is not truly exogenous, we use the 
Indian data for an earlier year. We also check the robustness of the results to using the US 
data, and we find the industries are highly correlated using the US and the Indian data. For 
skilled labor intensity we had to rely exclusively on the US data since these data are not 
available or India.  We conduct two more robustness tests to make sure that the results are 
robust to the way these industries have been classified. First, instead of using an index value 
we use a dummy variable for above and below median labor intensive industries (since the 
actual values might differ across countries, but in a relative sense the intensities should be 
similar). Second we just look at the top and the bottom tercile (since the measurement error is 
likely to be the largest in the middle rank) of industries. 
   17 
noise in the data we use five year averages of the relevant variables to calculate the industry-
specific indicators. We also confirmed, where possible, that the relative industry rankings across 
various characteristics do not change over time. This robustness check gives credence to the 
belief that there are perhaps external technological reasons for why an industry uses more labor 
per unit of capital or depends more on infrastructure than others. We also find that these 
characteristics are highly correlated when calculated using different databases, and that the 
various characteristics are not highly correlated with each other.  Thus, there is independent 
variation in these characteristics; see Appendix C for details.  
 
State Characteristics: Have all states benefited equally from the delicensing reforms? If 
not, what factors can explain why some states were better positioned to gain from the reforms 
than others?  
 
Given its importance in production and the fact that it varies across states, physical 
infrastructure is certainly one such factor. Appendix D describes the data we use to capture 
infrastructure differences across Indian states.  Another factor that many observers point to 
concerns the regulatory environment faced by manufacturing firms. Importantly, the regulatory 
environment can vary by states.  This is because India's constitution distinguishes areas of 
regulatory responsibility in terms of whether authority rests with the central government, the 
state government, or both. For example, bankruptcy procedures and "exit policy" are under the 
exclusive purview of the central government; inspections and compliance with regulation come 
under the purview of the state government; labor regulation and "entry" are areas of joint 
responsibility (Conway and Herd, 2008).      18 
 
We consider two types of regulations that can vary across states in this paper: labor 
market regulations and product market regulations.  
 
While India's labor regulations have been criticized on many counts including, for 
example, the sheer size and scope of regulations, their complexity, and inconsistencies across 
individual pieces of regulation, a few specific pieces of legislation are the controversial ones. 
The key ones involve Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) and Section 9A of the 
IDA and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. The first of these makes it necessary 
for firms employing more than 100 workers to obtain the permission of state governments in 
order to retrench or lay off workers -- permission which some analysts argue is rarely 
forthcoming and thereby ends up raising the effective cost of labor usage in production.
15 As for 
the second and third, these pertain to the terms and conditions of work. While they seek to make 
labor contracts complete, fair, and legally binding they can constrain firms from making quick 
adjustments to changing conditions, especially in view of weaknesses in collective bargaining 
mechanisms.
16   
 
                                                           
15  Until 1976, the provisions of the IDA on retrenchments or layoffs were fairly uncontroversial.  
The IDA allowed firms to lay off or retrench workers as per economic circumstances as long as 
certain requirements such as the provision of sufficient notice, severance payments, and the order 
of retrenchment among workers (last in first out) were met.  An amendment in 1976 (the 
introduction of Chapter VB), however, made it compulsory for employers with more than 300 
workers to seek the prior approval of the appropriate government before workers could be 
dismissed.  A further amendment in 1982 widened the scope of this regulation by making it 
applicable to employers with 100 workers or more.  
16  See Anant (2000) for a discussion on this.   19 
It is important to note that not all analysts agree that India‘s labor laws have made for a 
rigid labor market.  In particular, a counter-argument to the views above is that the rigidity 
inducing regulations have been either ignored (see Nagaraj, 2002) or circumvented through the 
increased usage of temporary or contract labor (see Datta, 2003; Ramaswamy, 2003).
17 
Ultimately, whether India‘s labor laws have created significant rigidities in labor markets or not 
is an empirical issue. 
 
Unfortunately, quantifying differences in labor market regulations across states -- a 
critical step in evaluating whether labor regulations have been a dampener on industrial 
performance -- has proved to be contentious.  For example, Besley and Burgess (2004) exploit 
state-level amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) – arguably the most important set of 
labor regulations governing Indian industry -- and code legislative changes across major states as 
pro-worker, neutral, or pro-employer. While, in principle, the approach of Besley and Burgess 
has considerable merit, it is not without controversy. Bhattacharjea (2006), in particular, has 
argued that deciding whether an individual amendment to the IDA is pro-employer or pro-
worker in an objective manner is quite difficult. Even if individual amendments can be so coded, 
the actual workings of the regulations can hinge on judicial interpretations of the amendments. 
Moreover, if noncompliance with the regulations is widespread, then even an accurate coding of 
amendments which takes into account the appropriate judicial interpretation loses its meaning.   
 
We take the following approach in this paper. We start with the various attempts by 
different researchers at quantifying differences in labor regulations across India's major states. In 
                                                           
17 For a detailed review of Indian labor regulations and the debate surrounding the issue of 
rigidity, see Anant et al (2006).   20 
addition to Besley and Burgess (2004), this includes OECD (2007) and Bhattacharjea (2008).  A 
useful feature of the OECD measure of labor market regulations across states is that it 
incorporates state specific information on the enforcement machinery.  For example, information 
is provided on whether actions have been taken to reduce the transactions costs associated with 
the inspection regime. We calculate the labor market regulation variable by using a simple 
majority rule across different indicators.
18 Based on this rule we code the states as pro labor, pro 
business, or neutral if the majority of the studies in the literature which have calculated these 
codes do so. The advantage of calculating our variable in this way is that if a particular 
methodology or data source used by a researcher is subject to measurement error, then it will be 
weeded out in the rule. So unless several different sources systematically make a mistake in 
coding the states, we would not pick it up in our coding. Full details, including our final 
composite coding of states‘ labor market regulations (referred to as LMR in the tables on our 
regression results below) is given in Appendix E. 
 
Notwithstanding the delicensing reforms, product markets in India remain highly 
regulated relative to other countries.     It is widely believed that a number of the regulations  in 
place limit competition in product markets.  According to the World Bank‘s Doing Business 
survey, for example, starting a business in India is found to take a large amount of time due to 
the nature of regulations and administrative procedures involved (World Bank 2008): 73 days 
compared to 24 days in Pakistan and only 1 day in New Zealand! Similarly, the time taken to 
close a business in India is one of the longest in the world.   
                                                           
18 This is based on an approach used in Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2007) to find the currency 
crisis dates for different countries which differ across various studies in the literature. Rather 
than relying on a particular study or approach, they use the majority rule to find the currency 
crisis dates.    21 
 
As in the case of labor market regulations, some aspects of product market regulation are 
determined at the central level while others, including the enforcement of product market 
regulations, are determined at the state-level. Thus, product market regulations can be expected 
to vary across states.  Conway and Herd (2008), described in OECD (2007), collect data from 
state government officials belonging to various regulatory departments, as well as from a law 
firm operating in all of India's major states, on the state-specific requirements for setting up a 
business.  For example, they collect information on the administrative rules and procedures for 
obtaining clearances and approvals of various types.  All the information collected is then coded 
and aggregated into state-level indicators of product market regulations.  As described in more 
detail in Appendix E, we use the OECD indicators along with results from surveys of enterprise 
managers carried out as part of World Bank's investment climate studies in order to create a 
composite classification of states‘ product market regulations (or PMR).  In particular, India's 
major states are classified as having either competitive, neutral, or restrictive product market 
regulations.  In addition to capturing the nature of product market regulations at the state level, 
the classification can be interpreted as capturing the willingness of states to implement 
delicensing reforms undertaken at the central level.  
 
In Appendix E we also show the correlations between various state level characteristics. 
We observe that the labor market regulations at the state level are not correlated with other state 
level indicators of regulation or infrastructure, whereas the product market regulations, the 
infrastructure variables, financial development variables and per capita income are correlated   22 
highly with each other. In our regressions, therefore, when we include more than one of the latter 




The basic specification we use to analyze industrial performance is similar to the one 
used by Aghion et al (2006). However, we extend this basic specification using the approach of 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). That is, in addition to exploiting variation in state characteristics, we 
also exploit variation in industry characteristics. The most general specification used in our paper 
is given below: 
 
yist =   ʱis dis + βst dst+  θi trendi +  γ (delicensingit ) + δ (industry characteristici * delicensingit) + π  
(state characteristics * delicensingit) + τ  (state characteristics * industry characteristic i * 
delicensingit) +  μ other controls + εist                       (1) 
 
In equation 1, yist  is an industrial performance outcome (gross value added or 
employment) measured in logs. The first three right hand side terms include fixed effects of 
various types and industry specific time trends.  The dis‘s are industry-state fixed effects and  
dst‘s are state-year fixed effects. In lieu of industry-year fixed effects, which we cannot include in 
the regressions since the delicensing variable varies over industry and year, we include industry 
specific time trends. The state-year fixed effects account for any omitted variables which might 
vary over states or over state and year, such as developmental spending. The state-industry fixed 
effects can account for variables that are specific to state and industry combinations, e.g. if a   23 
state has a comparative advantage in certain industries because of geographical or historical 
reasons. Finally, industry specific trends can account for different rates of technological change 
in different industries. 
 
The next term in equation 1 is the delicensing dummy which varies over time and 
industry. The dummy takes the value one for the year when the delicensing requirement for a 
particular industry was removed and remains one for the rest of the sample period. Since we are 
including state-industry and state-year fixed effects in the regressions, the only additional 
variables we can include are the ones that vary over state, industry, and year; or over industry 
and year.  
 
The next term is an interaction of various industrial characteristics with the delicensing 
dummy. How do we interpret the coefficient of the interaction term involving the delicensing 
dummy and a particular industry characteristic? Consider the case where the particular industry 
characteristic is the labor intensity of industries and the coefficient for the interaction term is 
negative and significant. The coefficient then indicates that the industries which use labor more 
intensively have grown less post-delicensing as compared to the industries which use labor less 
intensively. This could be due to the fact that labor-intensive industries are constrained by the 
unavailability of certain inputs specific to these industrious; alternatively, there may be 
regulatory barriers which inhibit their growth.  
 
The next term in equation 1 is an interaction between the delicensing dummy and either 
the state level regulatory variables, or the state-level infrastructure related variables, or financial   24 
development. The coefficient π measures the impact of state regulations/infrastructure on the 
payoffs from reforms. State level regulatory variables include state specific measures of labor 
market regulations and product market regulations. The next term involving the delicensing 
dummy is an interaction of it with both industry characteristics and state characteristics. A 
particular combination for this interaction term which is of special interest to us involves the 
dummy for labor-intensive industries and a variable capturing labor market regulations at the 
state level. The results from this equation can shed further light on the effect of labor market 
regulations on industrial performance post-delicensing.  
 
Finally, equation 1 includes various control variables including initial per capita income 
of states interacted with delicensing, where initial per capita income can account for omitted 
variables which might vary across states and may affect the payoffs from reforms. Thus per 
capita income could proxy for geographical, cultural and institutional factors. We also include a 
variable initial share of industry i in state s, interacted with delicensing. This variable accounts 
for initial comparative advantage which might affect regulation, e.g. an initial comparative 
advantage of a state in labor intensive industries might imply that the state develops pro labor 
regulations and these sectors might be growing more slowly—thus erroneously attributing the 
slow growth of labor intensive industries to labor market regulations. These other control 
variables can also help us test for regional convergence and hysteresis.  
 
The variable εist is an error term. To allow for heteroskedasticity and deal with possible 
serial correlation in the error term, the standard errors are clustered by state-industry   25 
combinations.
19 We start our analysis in an exploratory way and first establish the heterogeneity 
in industrial performance post-delicensing by estimating a more parsimonious specification 
given by equation 2. 
 
yist =  ʱis dis + βst dst+  θi trendi   + γ (delicensingit ) + δ (industry characteristic * delicensingit) +  μ 
other controls +  εist                                         (2) 
 
  Next we look at the effect of state level regulations on the payoffs from reforms by 
estimating specifications based on equation (3)  
 
yist =  ʱis dis + βst dst+  θi trendi +   γ (delicensingit ) + π  (state characteristics * delicensingit) +  μ 
other controls + εist                                   (3)                          
            
Then we estimate the full specification in equation 1 to test whether the states with strict 
labor regulations affect labor intensive industries in particular.  
 
IV.  Empirical Results and Interpretation 
 
Effect of Delicensing on Different Industries  
 
Aghion et al (2006) find that delicensing had an uneven effect on the industrial 
performance of different states. They looked at this issue from the perspective of differences in 
                                                           
19 The results are robust to clustering by state and year of delicensing.    26 
the policies related to the labor market at the state level. Here we first establish that post-
delicensing performance varies across different industrial sectors as well.
20 We look at the labor 
intensive industries, skilled labor intensive industries, infrastructure dependence of industries 
(and separately the dependence on electricity and fuel and distribution).  
 
Did Labor Intensive Industries Benefit less from Delicensing? 
 
A common concern with the industrial performance in India has been that labor intensive 
industries, and the industries which can absorb the unskilled labor, have not performed well post 
reforms and consequently employment generation has been sluggish as well. Hence we first look 
at the labor intensive industries. 
 
In Table 1 we include the initial size of each industry interacted with delicensing, to 
account for convergence in real value added at the industry level. In column II-IV we include a 
dummy for  labor intensive industries interacted with delicensing. In column III we also include 
intensity of industries for infrastructure interacted with delicensing. In column IV we include the 
size of the establishment (average fixed capital required per factory) to account for the fact the 
labor intensive industries might be capturing some other characteristic of industries such as size. 
Results show that the effect of delicensing does differ significantly for labor and capital intensive 
                                                           
20 In Gupta, Hasan and Kumar (2008) we establish these patterns using the data aggregated at the 
All India level.   27 
industries. There is weak evidence to show that in addition to labor intensive industries, 
industries which use unskilled labor intensively grew less.
21  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
Next, we test whether other kinds of industries also benefited less from reforms. The 
results of this exercise also ensure that the results on labor intensive industries are not driven by 
the fact that these industries might be relying on some other factors of production affecting the 
gains from reforms. We, in particular, consider the industries that spend more on energy, or 
energy and distribution (a broader measure of infrastructure). As seen from Table 1, industries 
that use more energy or rely on distribution infrastructure grew less post-delicensing (relative to 
industries that spend less on energy and distribution and thus have less infrastructural needs). 
 
Even after controlling for the infrastructure intensity of industries, labor intensive 
industries have a negative coefficient. These results are robust to several different indices of 
infrastructure needs of the industries. Thus after controlling for many other characteristics, 
including the average size of enterprises in industries and the initial size of the industry, we still 
find that the labor intensive industries have experienced smaller growth in value added post-
delicensing.     
 
Is there Divergence across Indian States in Industrial production? And does hysteresis 
matter? 
                                                           
21 Results on size and low skilled labor intensity variables are stronger if we drop the industry 
Railway Locomotives, which seems to be an outlier.    28 
 
Next we turn to performance of the industries at the state level. As has been well 
established elsewhere, the regional income disparities have been increasing in India--the richer 
states have been growing faster than the poorer states. Here we first see whether the same pattern 
of regional divergence exists in organized Indian industries as well. Continuing to look at the 
three digit ASI industrial data we estimate the regression equation given by (4): 
 
Yist =  Σʱis dis + Σβst dst+  Σθi Trendi +   γ (delicensingit ) + δ (initial share of state s in industry I * 
delicensingit) + π  (initial per capita income of state s/or initial per capita income originating in 
the Industrial sector in state s) * delicensingit +  εist                       (4) 
 
In Equation 4 we include states share in each industry at the beginning of the period—as 
a proxy for the inherent comparative advantage of the state in a particular industry given factor 
endowments; and either per capita state domestic product, or per capita income in the industrial 
sector; both interacted with delicensing.  
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
We find that states with higher initial per capita income or higher per capita income originating 
in the industrial sector have experienced faster growth in industrial value added post-delicensing. 
Thus the divergence in industrial production has increased post-delicensing. One apparently 
anomalous result is that the states with higher shares of particular industries pre-delicensing 
experienced slower growth in those industries. At first blush this result seems to convey that the   29 
diversification in industrial structure across states has increased. But when we dig deeper it turns 
out to be primarily because industrial production growth has been slower in the poorer states 
even in industries in which these states had a higher initial share (perhaps because of 
comparative advantage, e.g. Bihar in extractive industries; or because of the presence of public 
sector units). This is captured by the interaction term between the initial share of each state in 
particular industries and the income group that the state belongs to (we divide states into three 
groups based on their per capita income).  
 
The variable income level takes three different values. It takes a value 2 if the  state 
belongs to the lowest per capita income level; 1 if it has the medium per capita income level and 
0 if it belongs to the highest per capita income level. The coefficient of this variable is negative 
and significant and when we include it, the coefficient for the initial share of states in industries 
becomes insignificant. This interpretation would then point to increasing divergence at the 
aggregate level, as well as at the specific industries level. Post-delicensing, richer states have 
experienced higher industrial growth and the growth has been higher in richer states even in 
industries in which they had a small share in 1980. 
 
Does Hysteresis (Path Dependence) Matter? 
 
Though not systematically documented, one explanation for the slow response of Indian 
industries to reforms has been an appeal to hysteresis.  The argument is as follows. Post-
independence, Indian states inherited an industrial structure which was primarily determined by 
the government, either through setting up of state enterprises or through encouragement of   30 
particular industries in particular states. The earlier set of interventions and policies ended with 
the policy reforms undertaken since the mid-1980s.  Yet, the industry specific capabilities that 
they created have persisted so that states have not been able to break away from earlier industrial 
patterns by either entering new industries or exiting old ones.   
 
In our results in Table 2, a positive and significant coefficient on the initial share of state 
s in industry i would have implied hysteresis. But this coefficient is either negative and 
significant, or insignificant. In either case it does not seem to be the case that industrial growth is 
determined by inherited capabilities. 
 
Does Infrastructure and Financial Development Matter for Benefits from Liberalization? 
 
In Table 3 below we include indicators of infrastructure availability at the state level in 
the regression specification given by Equation 3, where other controls are the same as before, i.e. 
per capita income and initial share of state s in industry i, both interacted with delicensing. We 
include several different indicators of infrastructure and use data from many different sources. 
These include indicators of physical infrastructure, overall infrastructure and human capital, and 
financial development. These measures are highly correlated with each other (see Appendix 
Table E3) as well as with per capita income. Hence, when we include more than one indicator of 
infrastructure these are individually not significant (due to lack of space we do not report all the 
results here). In order to avoid reverse causality we include the availability of infrastructure at 
the beginning of the period. Besides, at least for some of the indicators of financial development, 
we use variables such as number of scheduled bank branches per capita and credit by   31 
nationalized banks, the concern of reverse causality is less serious. In the Indian banking sector, 
which is largely publicly owned these variables are determined more by the objectives of social 
equity rather than expected economic performance of states (Burgess and Pande, 2005). 
 
In different columns in Table 3 we include indicators of physical infrastructure, such as 
the composite indices for physical infrastructure constructed by Kumar (2002), as well as indices 
for more specific aspects of infrastructure, including roads, and electricity generation. We 
include literacy rate as an indicator of human capital. For indicators pertaining to the financial 
sector we use the data put together by Purfield (2006), and include indicators of credit per capita 
by scheduled banks, number of branches per capita, and credit per capita by nationalized banks. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
The results indicate that infrastructure does matter for the payoffs from reforms. 
Although since the alternative series are correlated highly it is difficult for us to say what kind of 
infrastructure is more important for industrial growth. Moreover, there seems to be variation 
independent of per capita income, because when we include the indicators of infrastructure with 
per capita income (both interacted with delicensing) the infrastructure variable remains 
significant and with several of these infrastructural variables the per capita income variable 
either becomes insignificant or becomes negative and significant. This result could be interpreted   32 




Does Regulatory Framework Across States Matter for Growth? 
 
In order to assess the impact of regulatory burden on growth we include indexes 
pertaining to labor market regulations (LMR) and product market regulations (PMR), either one 
at a time or together in the regression specification given by equation 3. As explained in 
Appendix E, both regulatory variables can take three values. In the case of labor regulations, the 
index takes a value of 1 if regulations are pro-employer, 0 if they are neutral, and -1 if they are 
pro-worker.  Similarly, the product market regulation index takes a value of 1 if regulations are 
supportive of competition, 0 if they are neutral, and -1 if they impede competition.   
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
The results described in Table 4 show that states did not experience differential growth in 
production post-delicensing based on their labor regulations (we revisit this result shortly). States 
with a more liberal business environment, however, experienced faster growth post-delicensing. 
The product market regulation variable can also be interpreted as a measure of the willingness of 
                                                           
22 As is evident from the regressions results the R
2s are quite high and do not seem to vary 
across different specifications. The reason is of course that the fixed effects explain a great 
deal of variation in the data, and as compared to fixed effects the individual repressors add 
little to R
2.  As is customary, in order to gauge the appropriateness of individual regressors 
we look at the significance of each individual variable rather than R
2.  
   33 
states to carry out product market reforms initiated at the center. Hence, states with a higher 
score on product market regulations may well be the ones where delicensing – which was a 
reform measure passed by the center -- was implemented either more effectively or earlier as 
compared to other states. Interpreted this way the results indicate that the benefits from 
liberalization accrued to the states if their willingness to reform matched those of the center. In 
column III we include labor regulations and product market regulations simultaneously in the 
regression; indicators of infrastructure with regulatory variables are included in columns IV-VII. 
Results on labor regulations do not change, and since product market regulations and 
infrastructure are correlated strongly, when we include them together their individual coefficients 
are smaller and less significant.  
 
Next, we explore the possibility that delicensing affected labor intensive and capital 
intensive industries differently across states with different labor regulations. Thus we include the 
following two variables in our base specification: a dummy for labor intensive industries 
interacted with delicensing; and a three way interaction between labor intensity of industries, 
labor market regulation and delicensing.  
 
Results indicate that while labor intensive industries grew less post-delicensing and states 
with different labor regulations do not show any specific patterns post-delicensing, labor 
intensive industries have performed particularly worse in states with pro-labor regulations. Thus 
it seems that the pro-labor regulations hurt where it matters the most—industries which employ 
more labor. In various columns in Table 5 we check the robustness of this key result by changing 
the sample and by including other controls in the regressions. Thus in Column II we only look at   34 
the states where the labor market regulations are either considered to be pro labor or pro 
business, and drop the states with neutral labor regulations. In Column III we drop tobacco, and 
petroleum industries, and in Columns IV-VI we respectively include product market regulations, 
infrastructure and financial sector variables, interacted with delicensing.
23 
 
The results are robust as the coefficient and significance of our key variable of interest 
does not change.  
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
One concern remains and this is that our results might be driven by omitted variables. 
There can be two kinds of omitted variables - those related to states and those related to 
industries.  For example, there could be another set of industries, correlated with labor intensity, 
which has performed poorly in states with inflexible labor regulations post-delicensing and our 
interaction term involving labor regulations, labor intensive industries, and delicense could be 
picking up the effect on value added due to these industries. Similarly there could be another 
state characteristic correlated with labor regulations which is associated with poor performance 
of labor intensive industries post-delicensing. However, we think that omitted variables are not a 
problem for our results since labor intensity is not correlated with most other industry 
characteristics and labor regulation is not correlated with other state features that we have 
considered in the paper. Nevertheless, we conduct robustness tests where starting with our base 
                                                           
23 Other robustness tests conducted but not shown here include clustering by state-delicense; and 
by including the full set of fixed effects: state-industry, industry year and state year instead of 
other control variables which vary along these dimensions alone. Results are found to be robust.   35 
specification in column I in Table 6, we include other industry characteristics and other state 
characteristics.  
 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
In column II we report the results where along with labor intensity we include the 
infrastructure variable. Results for variables involving labor regulations and labor intensity of 
industries are unchanged. In the second robustness test we include per capita income interacted 
with delicensing and interacted with labor regulations and delicensing. Again, the results on 
variables involving labor regulations and labor intensity are preserved and are somewhat 
stronger. We also include variables pertaining to infrastructure and the financial sector in a 
similar fashion and find the results to be robust (these are not shown here for brevity). In the last 
two columns we experiment with different samples for the specification in Column II—in 
Column IV we drop states with neutral labor regulations and in the last column we drop 
petroleum and tobacco industries. We also estimate kitchen sink regressions with indicators of 
financial sector development and physical infrastructure variables thrown in the base 
specification in Table 4 and 5. The results mostly show that the individual state level variables 
have insignificant coefficients (perhaps because of multicollinearity). In some specifications 
indicators of physical infrastructure are found to be positive and significant.  
 
Among other robustness tests that we conducted (the results are not reported here but are 
available upon request) we include the skill intensive industries interacted with delicensing in 
our regressions to see whether the relatively worse performance of the labor intensive industries,   36 
i.e. the relatively better performance of the capital intensive industries, is driven by the fact that 
the latter might be skill intensive which, as has often been pointed out in the literature, have done 
better because of the capacities that India generated early on in the post-independence period. 
This does not seem to be the case though. If it was, then the coefficient of labor intensive 
industries would be insignificant once we included skill intensity in the regressions. Instead, 
results show that even after controlling for skill intensity all the key results on labor intensive 
industries hold.  
 
Another test we perform is to look at the value of output rather than value added as the 
dependent variable. The rationale is that if labor intensive industries are outsourcing more of 
their activities in recent years, especially post-delicensing, perhaps because it is easier to do so 
technologically, then one would see these industries growing less in terms of value added. 
According to this argument if we appropriately account for outsourcing then the performance of 
labor intensive industries would be similar to other industries. Our results using the value of 
output as a dependent variable show results that are similar to those using value added. Thus the 
outsourcing argument is not valid. 
 
Looking at the role of labor regulations in determining the payoffs from reforms we 
consider another key variable where labor regulations are supposed to be making the biggest 
dent—i.e. employment. For employment we use a slightly different specification: since 
employment can be expected to move closely with production, in order to examine movements 
in employment which are independent of changes in production, we include gross value added in   37 
the regressions. Results show that post-delicensing employment generation has been higher in 
the states with flexible labor regulations.  
 
[Table 7 around here] 
 
We include several other state characteristics in Columns II-IV, to see whether these are 
associated with similar patterns in employment, but unlike the case of value added, we do not 
find state level product market regulations and infrastructure and financial development variables 
to be associated with any specific patterns in employment gains stemming from delicensing. 
Interestingly, also unlike the case of value added, the effect on employment does not seem to 





In this paper we analyze the effects of the reforms that liberalized India‘s industrial 
licensing regime on the performance of registered manufacturing using Annual Survey of 
Industries data at the three digit level for major Indian states, for 1980-2004. Following the 
existing literature we use the date of delicensing, a policy whose timing varied across industries 
but was national in scope, as our measure of policy reform. We highlight the heterogeneity in 
industrial performance across Indian states as well across industries. In particular, we find that 
the impact of delicensing has been highly uneven across industries. Industries which are labor 
intensive, use unskilled labor, or depend on infrastructure (or are energy dependent) have   38 
experienced smaller gains from reforms. We also find that the regulations at the state level 
matter. States with less competitive product market regulations have experienced slower growth 
in the industrial sector post-delicensing, as compared to states with competitive product market 
regulations. States with relatively inflexible labor regulations have experienced slower growth of 
labor-intensive industries and slower employment growth. Infrastructure availability and 
financial sector development are found to be important in determining the benefits that accrued 
to states from reforms. 
 
The results imply that though important steps have been taken by liberalizing several 
specific policies to promote industrial growth in India; the task is not complete yet. These policy 
reforms have yielded gains that have been uneven geographically and modest overall. The 
relative magnitude of gains across states has depended on the availability of infrastructure, 
regulations governing the use of labor and overall regulatory burden. In order to achieve 
favorable results at a wider level the reforms need to be carried forward.  In particular, promoting 
the growth of labor intensive industries and employment will require some rationalization of 
labor regulations governing industrial workers.  In addition, in a federal democracy like India, 
reforms at the center need to be complemented by reforms at the state level. Finally, provision of 
better infrastructure, both physical and financial is critical for faster industrial growth.    
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Appendix A: Data Sources  
 
The primary data used in this paper comes from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 
for 1980-81 to 2004-05. ASI is the principal source of industrial statistics in India and the survey 
is  undertaken  by  the  Ministry  of  Statistics  and  Programme  Implementation  (Government  of 
India). Aggregated tables at the All-India and the State level based on 3-digit National Industrial 
Classification for India are used.  
 
There are four different classifications (NIC 1980, NIC 1987, NIC 1998, NIC 2004) in 
use over this 25 year period. The first step in developing comparable data over time was to 
prepare  a  concordance  matching  industries  across  the  four  different  classifications.  The 
concordance  exercise  leaves  us  with  49  industries.  This  is  a  unique  database  on  industrial 
statistics in India in terms of its coverage at the state-industry level and the time length. Data 
seems  good  and  comparable  pre  and  post  1998,  when  there  was  a  change  in  the  sampling 
framework.  
 
The following industries were excluded from the analysis: dressing and dyeing of fur, 
saw milling, and publishing, processing of nuclear fuels and reproduction of recorded media. In 
addition, following Aghion et al (2007) we drop ―other manufacturing‖ (NIC-98 code 369) as 
this industry category is a grouping of different activities, and the activities are likely to vary 
from one state to the other rendering this industry category incomparable across states. For the 
purposes of this paper, since we are working with aggregated data, the sampling unit is the state-
industry pair and the data are representative at that level. We observe repeated entry and exit of   45 
various state-industry pairs in the data, to minimize the role played by these observations we 
further restrict the data following Aghion et al. We use only state-industry pairs with at least 10 
years of data and further use only those industries that exist in at least eight states in each year. 
We further restrict ourselves to ―major‖ Indian states only. The list of states included in the 
analysis  is  :  Andhra  Pradesh,  Karnataka,  Punjab,  Assam,  Kerala,  Rajasthan,  Bihar,  Madhya 
Pradesh,  Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Orissa, West Bengal. The 
remaining states/Union Territories either have poor time series data or have very few industries 
or  there  share  in  manufacturing  GVA  is  less  than  1  percent.  Newly  formed  states  of 
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand were added to the respective states they were carved 
out from to create old states of Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh respectively and make 
the data comparable over time. The state characteristics of the original states in these cases have 
been used as if they would apply to the old state. 
 
ASI  frame  is  based  on  the  list  of  registered  factories/units  maintained  by  the  Chief 
Inspector of Factories in each State/Union Territory. Factory is the primary unit of enumeration 
in the survey for the case of manufacturing industries ,defined as the unit which is registered 
under sections 2m ( i ) and 2m ( ii ) of the Factories Act, 1948, i.e. premises whereon 10 or more 




Value added: Increment to the value of goods and services that is contributed by the factory, 
ASI.    46 
 
Total employment: Includes all blue collar workers and persons receiving wages and holding 
clerical or supervisory or managerial positions or engaged in administrative office, store keeping 
section and welfare section, sales department etc. 
 
Delicense: Dummy that takes a value 1 from when an industry was delicensed. 
 
Share of industry i in VA in 1980: Share of each industry in total industrial value added in 1980 
 
Size (log of fixed capital): Average fixed capital per factory in each industry in 1980. 
 
Labor Intensive Industry: Dummy that equals one when the industry has labor intensity above 
the median for industries. 
 
Low Skill Labor Intensive: Dummy that takes a value 1 if the share of compensation to low 
skilled workers in total value added exceeds the median for industries, in 1980 
Infrastructure Intensive Industry: Dummy that takes a value 1 if the share of expenditure on fuel and 
distribution is above the median for industries 
 
Share S,I in 1980: Share of state S, in Industry I‘s value added in 1980. 
 
Initial PCY in state s: State domestic product per capita in each state in 1980. 
 
Initial Industrial Output per capita in state s: Industrial value added per capita in each state in 1980   47 
 
Income level: Takes a value 2 if the state belongs to the bottom 1/3
rd  of the states on the basis of per 
capita income in 1980, 1 if the state belongs to middle 1/3
rd  of states, and 0 if the state belongs to the top 
1/3
rd of the states.  
 
Physical infrastructure: Index of physical infrastructure at state level in 1980 by Kumar (2002). 
 
Roads: Log, length of roads per capita (or per sq km) in each state in 1980. 
 
Electricity: Log electricity generated per capita in each state in 1980. 
 
Literacy: Literacy rate in 1980. 
 
Credit by Scheduled Banks: Log credit per capita in each state by scheduled banks in 1980. 
 
Branches: Bank branches per capita in 1990 in each state. 
 
Credit by national banks: Log credit per capita in each state by nationalized banks in 1980. 
 
Labor Market regulations (LMR): Takes three values: +1 if the state is considered to have pro 
business labor regulations, -1 if the state is deemed to have pro labor regulations and 0 if it has 
neutral regulations.  
   48 
Product market regulations (PMR): Takes three values:+1 if the state has competitive 
regulations, -1 if the state has cumbersome regulations, and 0 if the state has neutral product 
market regulations. 
   49 









1   
 
meat, fish, fruit, vegetables etc.; leather; paper; plastic products; 
glass; metal products; office/computing machinery; electric 
motors; other electric equipment; electronic components; 
television; radio transmitters; medical appliances and motor 
vehicle. 









dairy products; grain mill products; other food products; 
beverages; spinning, weaving; other textiles; knitted fabrics; 
weaving apparel; articles of fur; footwear; wood products; 
publishing; printing; processing of nuclear fuels; basic 
chemicals; non-metallic; iron and steel; basic precious/non-
ferrous metals; fabricated metal products; insulated wire and 
cable; accumulators, cells/batteries; optical and photographic 
equipment; watches; ships and boats; railway locomotives; 
transport equipment nec; furniture; and manufacturing nec. 
1993  293 
 
domestic appliances 
1997  201,223,232 
 
saw milling; recorded media; and refined petroleum products. 
Source:  We  update  the  data  provided  in  Aghion  et  al  (2006)  and  map  according  to  our  3  digit 
classification, as in Gupta, Hasan and Kumar (2008). 
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Appendix C: Industry Characteristics 
 
Labor intensity:  Defined as an index of the ratio of employment to real invested capital using the 
All-India ASI data averaged over the years 1980-84. Real invested capital is calculated by 
deflating nominal values of invested capital by the wholesale price index for the industry ―other 
electrical equipment‖ (NIC industry 319). 
 
Infrastructure Dependence (distribution intensity): Calculated as the ratio of distribution and 
power and fuel expenses to gross value added using the Prowess data (ratio of distribution 
expenses to gross value added). It is the average of the ratio over the period 1994-1998 
 
Energy Dependence: Calculated as the ratio of power and fuel expenses to gross value added 
using the ASI data, averaged for 1980-84. Another series was calculated using the data for the 
US using the EUKLEMS database.  
 
Unskilled labor intensity: calculated as the share of labor compensation to low-skilled workers in 
gross value added for USA using the data from EUKLEMS 
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Appendix Table C1: Correlations Between Different Industry Characteristics 





















Low skilled Labor   0.08  1           
Infrastructure Intensive   -0.13  0.17  1         
Fuel Intensity  -0.11  0.14  0.95***  1       
Distribution Intensity  -0.13  0.15  0.60***  0.31**  1     
Energy dependence  -0.22  0.14  0.73***  0.76***  0.24  1   
Energy dependence--US  -0.31**  -0.12  0.31***  0.21  0.35***  0.45***  1 
Exporting Industries  0.18  0.29***  -0.15  -0.22  0.14  -0.20  -0.18 
*,**,*** indicate that the correlation coefficients are significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance 
respectively. 
 
The table above shows that the correlation of similar industry characteristics calculated 
using different sources is high; correlation across different characteristics is not high. For each of 
these series we have data from various points in time. The values of these series are highly 
correlated over time.  This reinforces the point that the relative input usage across industries 
reflects the technical requirements of various industries and is thus unlikely to change much over 
time or across countries. 
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Appendix D: Infrastructure Indices for States 
 
Various researchers have developed infrastructure indices at the state level which 
aggregate information on different kinds of infrastructure into one indicator. We use the 
infrastructure index developed by Ghosh and De, 2004 and Kumar, 2002 . Both the studies 
construct different sub-components of infrastructure, i.e. physical infrastructure development 
index , social infrastructure development index, financial infrastructure development index for 
the major Indian states and at different points in time . Kumar also constructs an overall 
infrastructure development index .  
 
  Ghosh and De, 2004 (GD)—  Kumar, 2002 (TRK)  
Physical 
infrastructure 
development index  
Transport facilities, irrigated 
area, consumption of 
electricity, telephone mainline  
Villages electrified, electricity consumption, 
railways and surfaced roads, post offices, 
telecommunication, irrigation extent.  
 
Social infrastructure 
development index  
 
Literacy rate, infant mortality 
rate, people living in ‗pucca‘ 
(concrete structure) houses 
 
Population with primary education, literacy 
rate, educational institutions, public health 




development index  
 
credit/ deposit ratio in 
nationalised banks, the state‘s 
own tax effort (tax revenue/ 
NSDP) and number of post 
offices per 10,000 population 
 
Bank offices per unit area, per capita bank 








Village electrified, railways and surfaced 
roads, post offices, irrigation extent, 
educational institutions, public health 
institutions, bank offices  
 
In a background paper for the Eleventh Finance Commission, Anant, Krishna and 
Roychoudhry (1999) also develop an infrastructure index at the state level. The different   53 
infrastructure series are correlated highly across different sources as well as across different 
points in time.    54 
Appendix E: Labor Market and Product Market regulations 
 
As noted in the text, India's constitution gives its states control over various areas of 
regulation.  In these areas, states have the authority to enact their own laws and amend 
legislations passed by the center. Typically, states also have the authority to decide on the 
specific administrative rules and procedures for enforcing legislations passed by the center 
(Conway and Herd 2008).  Labor market regulations and product market regulations are two 
areas in which states have such control over regulation and enforcement. Accordingly, various 
studies have attempted to codify state level differences in regulation.   
 
In what follows, we describe these studies‘ approach for characterizing states‘ stance on 
labor regulations and product market regulations. We also describe our attempt at combining the 
information from different studies, reconciling major differences when they come up, and 
coming up with a composite classification of regulatory regimes at the state level. 
 
Labor Market Regulations 
 
Besley and Burgess (2004): Besley and Burgess work with state-level amendments to the 
Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) between 1958 and 1992.
24, 
25 Each amendment is coded as a 1, -1, 
                                                           
24  The IDA lays down procedures for settlement of disputes, as well as the conditions under 
which layoffs, retrenchment, and closure of an establishment can take place and the appropriate 
level of compensation in each case.  The IDA also prescribes the terms under which employers 
may change the ‗conditions of service‘ of workers.    55 
or 0 depending on whether the amendment in question is deemed to be pro-worker, pro-
employer, or neutral. The scores are then cumulated over time with any multiple amendments for 
a given year coded to give the general direction of change. 
 
Since the actual time-series variation in the cumulated amendments within states is quite 
limited for the period we are interested in (1980 and beyond), we compute the average value for 
each state over 1980-1997.  These averages range from a high of 3.17 in West Bengal to a low of 
-2.28 in Andhra Pradesh. Next, we use the following rule to assign to each state a particular 
stance on labor regulations: pro-worker (or inflexible), neutral, pro-employer (or flexible).  
States with an average greater (less) than zero are deemed to have inflexible (flexible) labor 
regulations; states with an average of zero are treated as having a neutral stance on labor 
regulations. Thus, for example, Andhra Pradesh would be classified as having flexible labor 
regulations while West Bengal would be classified as having inflexible labor regulations.   
 
We make two important changes to the original coding. Gujarat has been designated as 
pro-worker by Besley and Burgess.  As noted by Bhattacharjea (2006), this is on account of a 
"solitary amendment passed in 1973, allowing for a penalty of 50 rupees a day on employers for 
not nominating representatives to firm level joint management councils‖. Given the fairly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25 Given very limited amendment activity in the 1990s and beyond, the original Besley and 
Burgess coding can be treated as applicable up to the present period considered in this paper. As 
noted in OECD (2007), only eight amendments have been recorded since 1990.  All of these can 
be accounted by three states. Most importantly, only one amendment -- passed in 2004 -- appears 
―to be of any consequence to labor market outcomes‖ (OECD 2007).   56 
inconsequential nature of this amendment, we modify Besley and Burgess‘ coding of labor 
regulations in Gujarat as neutral. Similarly, in the case of Madhya Pradesh, the average of the 
Besley and Burgess cumulative amendments is very mildly negative over 1980-1997. Since it is 
so close to zero, we treat it as effectively zero, or in other words, neutral. This is exactly how the 
state tends to appear based on a majority of the other studies.  Column 1 of Appendix Table E1 
describes our final coding of states‘ stance on labor regulations based on Besley and Burgess 
cumulative amendments data and the changes described above. 
  
Bhattacharjea (2008): Bhattacharjea focuses his attention on characterizing state level 
differences in Chapter VB of the IDA (which relates to the requirement for firms to seek 
government permission for layoffs, retrenchments, and closures). In a fairly radical departure 
from the work of Besley and Burgess, Bhattacharjea considers not only the content of legislative 
amendments, but also judicial interpretations to Chapter VB in assessing the stance of states vis-
à-vis labor regulation. Moreover, Bhattacharjea carries out his own assessment of legislative 
amendments as opposed to relying on that of Besley and Burgess.
26 He considers two types of 
regulatory changes: those pertaining to the employment threshold beyond which permission for 
retrenchments, layoffs, or closures is required; and those to the requirement of obtaining 
                                                           
26 Bhattacharjea (2006) argues that Besley and Burgess‘ coding of state level amendments to the 
IDA as pro-worker, neutral, or pro-employer were flawed on several accounts, including 
misinterpretation of various amendments, assignment of identical scores to both minor 
procedural amendments as well as major changes in job security norms, and the use of a 
"misleading‖ cumulation of coded amendments over time.   57 
permission -- for example, whether permission is needed for closure or for both closure and 
retrenchment. 
 
Bhattacharjea‘s detailed account of legislative and judicial interventions affecting 
Chapter VB enables him to identify points at which one or more states has diverged from the rest 
of the country. Based on this account, the following characterization appears to emerge.  In so far 
as the employment threshold is concerned, West Bengal has the most pro-worker regime (a 
threshold of 50 workers since 1980) while UP has the most pro-employer regime (a threshold of 
300 applies throughout the period under consideration). Maharashtra emerges as more pro-
worker than the average state because of the lower threshold of 100 introduced in 1982 instead of 
1984 as in most other states. Orissa emerges as slightly more pro-worker than the average state 
on similar grounds.   
 
We accordingly classify UP as having a flexible regime and West Bengal, Maharashtra, 
and Orissa as having an inflexible regime vis-à-vis the employment threshold. Admittedly, it 
may seem rather strong to treat Maharashtra and Orissa as inflexible on account of employment 
thresholds on the basis of two years (1982 and 1983). But, the fact that a certain state passes a 
legislative amendment or judicial interpretation one way or the other probably suggests 
something meaningful about a state‘s stance on labor regulation over a non-trivial period of time. 
States have also differed in terms of the requirement for government permission for retrenching 
and closures. Maharashtra and Orissa emerge as having required permission on more counts than 
the typical state at various points of time in the early 1980s (two years for Maharashtra and one 
year for Orissa). We classify both states as inflexible in so far as the requirement for permission   58 
are concerned. Karnataka, UP, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu emerge as having had less 
stringent requirements on permission than the typical state over various years (3, 13, 11, and 3 
years, respectively, between the mid-1980s and 2001). We classify these four states as flexible.   
 
Column 2-3 of Appendix Table E1 describe our coding of states‘ stance on the need for 
permission for retrenchments, layoffs, and closures and the threshold employment levels at 
which permission becomes necessary for retrenchments and/or closures based on Bhattacharjea 
(2008).  Column 4 describes a composite measure of labor regulations combining the 
information in Columns 2 and 3.  This composite measure is constructed as follows.  We assign a 
score of 1 for flexible regulations, a 0 for neutral regulations, and-1 to inflexible regulations.  We 
next consider the average across the scores in Columns 2 and 3.  A positive number is deemed to 
represent flexible regulations while a negative number represents inflexible regulations. 
 
OECD (2007): A recent OECD study on state-level labor reforms in India uses a survey to 
identify the areas in which states have made specific changes to the implementation and 
administration of labor laws.  In particular, the survey scores progress in 21 states in introducing 
changes in recent years to not only regulations dealing with labor issues, but also the relevant 
administrative processes and enforcement machinery.  The regulations covered by the state 
specific survey go well beyond the IDA and include the Factories Act, the Trade Union Act, and 
Contract Labour Act among others.  Within each major regulatory area, a number of issues is 
considered.  Scores are given on the basis of whether or not a given state has introduced changes. 
A higher score is given for changes that  are deemed to be pro-employer. 
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The OECD study aggregates the responses on each individual item across the various 
regulatory and administrative areas into an index that reflects the extent to which procedural 
changes have reduced transaction costs vis-à-vis labor issues.  The reduction in transaction costs 
can come about for different reasons including reductions in the scope of regulations, removing 
ambiguities in their application, and simplifying compliance procedures. 
 
Based on the values of the index, we partition the states that are the concern of this paper 
into three equal groups of five. States with a flexible labor related regime include: Andhra 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh.  States with an inflexible labor related 
regime include: Assam, Bihar, Kerala, Maharashtra, and West Bengal .  The remaining are 
treated as having a neutral stance.  Column 5 of Appendix Table E1 describes our coding of 
states‘ stance on labor regulations based on OECD (2007).  
 
A Composite Measure of Labor Regulations across States  
As noted in the text, labor market regulations can be notoriously hard to quantify. 
However, there do seem to be certain patterns that are common across the various studies of 
state-level labor regulations. This can be seen from a quick look at the various columns of 
Appendix Table E1 where diametrically opposite classifications are unusual and not the norm. 
We create a composite classification of states‘ stance on labor regulations by first assigning 
scores of 1 for flexible regulations, a 0 for neutral regulations, and-1 to inflexible regulations in 
Columns 1, 4, and 5 and then adopting a simple majority rule to decide on the overall composite 
stance of labor regulations    This composite classification is provided in Column 6. 
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Appendix Table E1:  Labor Market Regulations (LMR)Across States 








Andhra Pradesh  Flexible  0  0  0  Flexible  1 
Assam  0  0  0  0  Inflexible  0 
Bihar  0  0  0  0  Inflexible  0 
Gujarat  0*  0  0  0  Flexible  0 
Haryana  0  0  0  0  Flexible  0 
Karnataka  Flexible  Flexible  0  Flexible  0  1 
Kerala  Flexible  0  0  0  Inflexible  0 
Madhya Pradesh  0*  0  0  0  0  0 
Maharashtra  Inflexible  Inflexible  Inflexible  Inflexible  Inflexible  -1 
Orissa  Inflexible   Inflexible  Inflexible  Inflexible  0  -1 
Punjab  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Rajasthan  Flexible  0  0  0  Flexible  1 
Tamil Nadu  Flexible  Flexible  0  Flexible  0  1 
Uttar Pradesh  0  Flexible  Flexible  Flexible  Flexible  1 
West Bengal  Inflexible  Flexible  Inflexible  0  Inflexible  -1 
Note:  * Original coding was changed on the basis of narrative/evidence from other studies. In the last 
column a 1 refers to flexible, 0 to neutral and -1 to inflexible labor market regulations.  
 
Product Market Regulations 
 
Unlike the case of labor market regulations, studies characterizing product market 
regulations across Indian states are much fewer.  In fact, only one study appears to have dealt 
with this issue in a systematic manner (OECD, 2007).
27  Below, we describe the measures of 
product market regulations based on OECD (2007).  We also consider another indicator based on 
the World Bank's investment climate study (ICS) for India (World Bank 2005).   
 
                                                           
27  The OECD study is based on the work of Conway and Herd (2008) and Conway, Herd, and 
Chalaux 2008.   61 
OECD (2007):  OECD (2007) uses a survey instrument in order to assess the regulatory 
environment facing businesses across Indian states. The survey collects data from state 
government officials belonging to various regulatory departments as well as from a law firm on 
the state specific requirements for setting up two different types of businesses. The information 
gathered pertain to two sets of issues: the extent of "state-control" and "barriers to 
entrepreneurship". The former covers such issues as public ownership of enterprises, the scope of 
the public enterprise sector, its size, and the extent of direct control over business enterprises.  
Barriers to entrepreneurship cover administrative burdens on startups and administrative rules 
and procedures for obtaining clearances and approvals of various types among other things. The 
information collected is used for constructing indicators of product market regulation.   
In our analysis, we consider the indicator based on "barriers to entrepreneurship".  A higher 
value on the indicator represents a more restrictive regulatory regime in product markets.  Out of 
the 15 states we consider, we consider the 5 states with the highest scores as having a restrictive 
regulatory climate in product markets. Five states with the low scores are treated as having a 
competitive regulatory climate. The remaining 5 are deemed to have a neutral regulatory climate.  
Column 1 of Appendix Table E2 also presents this coding.  
 
Investment climate study (World Bank, 2005):  Although, the ICS does not present a ready 
measure of product market regulations across states, it records the perceptions of managers in 
Indian manufacturing firms across the major states regarding various aspects of the ―investment 
climate‖. A particularly robust question across various rounds of the ICS is one in which firms‘ 
managers are asked their opinion on which state, other than that in which they are located, has 
the ―best‖ investment climate. We assign to each state the percentage of respondents choosing   62 
that state as having the best investment climate.   States with relatively large (low) proportion of 
votes for best investment climate are deemed to have competitive (restrictive) product market 
regulations with those in the middle deemed to have a neutral stance on product market 
regulations.  We considered an assignment whereby we would have an equal number of states in 
each of the three categories.  However, this presented a problem.  Andhra Pradesh was the fifth-
ranked state from the top; therefore, it should be coded as having competitive product market 
regulations according to an equal three-way categorization.  But the proportion of votes it 
received was very similar to that of Haryana (the sixth-ranked) and quite different from 
Karnataka (the fourth-ranked).  Thus we coded Andhra Pradesh as having a neutral stance on 
product market regulations.  Column 2 of Appendix Table E2 presents the coding.  
 
A Composite Measure of Product Market Regulations across States:  As may be 
seen,  by comparing Columns 1 and 2, the classification of states‘ product market regulations are 
fairly similar across the OECD and ICS based measures. In other words, classifications based on 
a reading of actual regulations are fairly similar to perceptions of managers of manufacturing 
enterprises. In order to arrive at a composite measure of product market regulations, we assign a 
score of 1 for competitive regulations, a 0 for neutral regulations, and-1 to restrictive regulations.  
We next consider the average across the scores in Columns 1 and 2.  A positive number is 
deemed to represent flexible regulations while a negative number represents inflexible 
regulations.   
It may be noted that Gujarat is the only state where the OECD and ICS based measures 
yield diametrically opposite classifications of product market regulations. As noted in Conway, 
Herd, and Chalaux (2008), the low score of this state on the OECD indicators arises from a very   63 
large public enterprise sector and relatively high administrative burdens on firms. Why 
managers‘ perceptions are very different for this state is unclear. While it could be because of the 
manner in which regulations are enforced – perhaps in a light manner in Gujarat as speculated by 
Conway et al -- managers perceptions may also be influenced by the quality of public 
infrastructure.  
 
Appendix Table E2:  Product Market Regulations (PMR) Across States 
State  OECD-barriers  
to entrepreneurship 
ICS* best votes  PMR  
Andhra Pradesh  0  0  0 
Assam  Restrictive  Restrictive  -1 
Bihar  Restrictive  Restrictive  -1 
Gujarat  Restrictive  Competitive  0 
Haryana  Competitive  0  1 
Karnataka  Competitive  Competitive  1 
Kerala  0  0  0 
Madhya Pradesh  0   Restrictive  -1 
Maharashtra  Competitive  Competitive  1 
Orissa  0  Restrictive  -1 
Punjab  Competitive  0  1 
Rajasthan  Restrictive  Restrictive  -1 
Tamil Nadu  Competitive  Competitive  1 
Uttar Pradesh  0  0  0 
West Bengal  Restrictive  0  -1 
Note:  In the Column 3, a 1 refers to competitive, 0 to neutral and -1 to restrictive product market regulations.  
 
 





Appendix Table E3:  Correlation Between Regulatory and Infrastructure Variables 
  LMR  PMR  PCY  Infrastructure  Roads  Electricity  Bank Credit 
               
Product Market regulations  0.23  1           
Per Capita Income  -0.21  0.71***  1         
Infrastructure   0.10  0.78***  0.72***  1       
Roads  0.34  0.82***  0.71***  0.70***  1     
Electricity  -0.08  0.73***  0.83***  0.71***  0.81***  1   
Bank Credit  -0.08  0.82***  0.86***  0.80***  0.72***  0.77***  1 
Bank Branches  0.05  0.78***  0.73***  0.86***  0.73***  0.73***  0.89*** 
*,**,*** indicate that the correlation coefficients are significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance 
respectively. 
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Agriculture Industry Services  
Source: CSO National accounts data, at 1999-2000 prices. Sectoral shares used in the 
calculation of contribution of the three sectors to overall GDP growth are based on the average 
shares in the three periods respectively. GDP statistics for the fiscal year 2007-08 are based on 
advanced estimates and are subject to revision.  
 
                                                           
28 Data in Figure 1 pertain to industry as opposed to manufacturing (and includes manufacturing 
(registered and unregistered), construction, and utilities); and is drawn from the National 
Accounts Statistics (NAS). In the regression analysis in the rest of the paper we use the industry 
level data for only registered manufacturing, drawn from the Annual Survey of Industries. Thus 
the data in Figure 1 for industry are not directly comparable with the data used in Figure 2 
onwards. In fact, the data for registered manufacturing in NAS is derived from the data for 
registered manufacturing in the ASI, but it does not match exactly with the latter. This is because 
while the estimates in NAS in the base year 1999-2000 are drawn from the data in ASI in that 
year, the base year numbers are extrapolated for subsequent years using the growth rates 
observed in the series for Index for Industrial Production (IIP) and the WPI at the NAS 
compilation category.   67 
Figure 2: Performance of Indian Manufacturing (Registered) 







































































































































































Log of Total Employment Log of Blue Collared Employment
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Source: Annual Survey of Industries 1980-81 to 2004-05. The aggregate numbers at the All-
India level used above are only for the manufacturing sector and leaves out six industries due to 
lack of complete time series. Please see Appendix E for details.   69 
Figure 3: Regulations, Infrastructure and Indian Industry 
    

























































































Real Gross Value Added in flexible labor markets
Real Gross Value Added in inflexible labor markets  
























































































Real Gross Value Added in competitive product markets
Real Gross Value Added in restrictive product markets  
   70 
 

























































































Real Gross Value Added in states with good physical infrastructure
Real Gross Value Added in states with bad physical infrastructure     
 
 

























































































Real Gross Value Added in states with good infrastructure, Scheduled bank credit per capita




   71 
 

























































































Real Gross Value Added in Above Median Labor Intensive Industries
Real Gross Value Added in Below Median Labor Intensive Industries  
 
 





























































































Real Gross Value Added in Labor Intensive Industries in Flexible Labor Markets
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Real Gross Value Added in Below Median Labor Intensive Industries in Flexible Labor Markets
Real Gross Value Added in Below Median Labor Intensive Industries in Inflexible Labor Markets  
 
 
Source: ASI data for registered manufacturing at three digit level of classification.   73 












































Source: Based on Aghion et al (2006) and extended by the authors. 
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Table 1: Did Labor Intensive Industries Benefit less from Delicensing? 
   I  II  III  IV 
  Dependent Variable: Log Real Value 
Added 
Delicense  -0.001  0.07  0.17**  0.26 
  [0.02]  [1.27]  [2.52]  [0.59] 
Share of industry i in VA in 
1980*Delicense 
0.003  0  0.003  0.001 
  [0.47]  [0.08]  [0.50]  [0.13] 
Size (log of fixed capital)*Delicense        -0.018 
        [0.43] 
Labor Intensive Industry*Delicense  -0.15**  -0.16**  -0.18** 
    [2.24]  [2.32]  [1.97] 
Infrastructure Intensive Industry*Delicense    -0.33***   
      [2.76]   
State-Ind FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State-Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Ind-Year FE  No  No  No  No 
Ind-Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  13257  13257  13257  13257 
Number of state-industry  579  579  579  579 
R-squared  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87 
Note: Robust t statistics are given in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are clustered by State-Industry pairs in all specifications.  
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Table 2: Divergence Across Indian States in Industrial Production 
  I  II  III  IV  V 
  Dependent Variable: Log Real Value Added 
Delicense   0.09*  -0.01  -0.016  0.11**  -0.01 
  [1.86]  [0.23]  [0.35]  [2.32]  [0.11] 
Share S,I in 1980*Delicense  -0.015***  -0.016***  -0.016***  -0.004  -0.01 
  [3.40]  [3.43]  [3.44]  [1.14]  [1.44] 
Initial PCY in state s*Delicense  0.016**      0.02*** 
    [2.38]      [2.79] 
Initial Industrial Output per capita in state s*Delicense    0.01**     
      [2.54]     
Initial output share*Income level *Delicense    -0.02***  -0.02*** 
(income level=2 lowest; 1 medium, 0 highest)        [4.02]  [4.07] 
State-Ind FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State-Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Ind-Year FE  No  No  No  No  No 
Ind-Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  13257  13257  13257  13257  13257 
R-squared  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87 
Note: Robust t statistics are given in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are clustered by State-Industry pairs in all specifications.   
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 Table 3: Infrastructure and Payoffs from Delicensing 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
  Dependent Variable: Log Real Value Added 
Delicense   -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
  [0.13]  [0.16]  [0.11]  [0.19]  [0.13]  [0.14]  [0.13] 
Share S,I  in 1980*Delicense  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02*** 
  [3.50]  [3.44]  [3.58]  [3.52]  [3.66]  [3.55]  [3.70] 
Initial PCY in state s*Delicense  0.013*  -0.24*  -0.11*  -0.018  -0.18**  -0.02  -0.11** 
  [1.95]  [1.95]  [1.96]  [0.81]  [2.00]  [1.10]  [2.08] 
Physical infrastructure*Delicense  0.12**             
  [2.25]             
Roads*Delicense    0.32**           
    [2.09]           
Electricity*Delicense      0.22**         
      [2.26]         
Literacy*Delicense        0.006*       
        [1.66]       
Credit by Scheduled Banks*Delicense        0.25**     
          [2.19]     
Branches*Delicense            0.008**   
            [2.03]   
Credit by national banks*Delicense            0.25** 
              [2.40] 
State-Ind FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
State-year FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Ind-year FE  no  no  no  no  no  no  no 
Ind-trends  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  13257  13257  13257  13257  13257  13257  13257 
Number of state-industry  579  579  579  579  579  579  579 
R-squared  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87 
Note: Robust t statistics are given in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are clustered by State-Industry pairs in all specifications.  
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Table 4: Does the Regulatory Framework Across States Matter for Growth? 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
  Dependent Variable: Log Real Value Added 
Delicense   -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
  [0.23]  [0.16]  [0.15]  [0.14]  [0.13]  [0.13]  [0.15] 
Share S,I in 1980*  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02*** 
Delicense  [3.38]  [3.56]  [3.55]  [3.65]  [3.48]  [3.42]  [3.65] 
Initial PCY, State s*  0.02**  0.02**  0.02**  -0.11**  0.01*  0.01*  -0.15 
Delicense  [2.23]  [2.38]  [2.35]  [2.06]  [1.88]  [1.92]  [1.49] 
LMR*Delicense  0.01    -0.03  0.02  -0.01  -0.01  0.04 
  [0.09]    [0.33]  [0.26]  [0.10]  [0.18]  [0.50] 
PMR*Delicense    0.11*  0.12*      0.03  -0.06 
    [1.69]  [1.85]      [0.31]  [0.50] 
Bank Credit *        0.25**      0.33* 
Delicense        [2.39]      [1.66] 
Infrastructure*          0.12**  0.10   
Delicense          [2.30]  [1.31]   
State-Ind FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State-Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Ind-Year FE  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Ind-Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  13257  13257  13257  13257  13257  13257  13257 
Number of state-industry  579  579  579  579  579  579  579 
R-squared  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87 
Note: Robust t statistics are given in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are clustered by State-Industry pairs in all specifications.  
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Table 5: Labor Market Regulations and Labor Intensive Industries 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
  Dependent Variable: Log Real Value Added 
Delicense   -0.01  -0.06  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  [0.11]  [0.94]  [0.38]  [0.04]  [0.02]  [0.03] 
Share S,I in 1980*Delicense  -0.02***  -0.01**  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02*** 
  [3.30]  [2.21]  [3.53]  [3.46]  [3.40]  [3.57] 
Initial PCY in state s*Delicense  0.02***  0.02*  0.03***  0.02***  0.02***  -0.10* 
  [2.97]  [1.94]  [3.58]  [3.07]  [2.64]  [1.88] 
Labor intensive Industry *Delicense  -0.18**  -0.21**  -0.20***  -0.18**  -0.18**  -0.18** 
  [2.57]  [2.27]  [2.79]  [2.54]  [2.54]  [2.55] 
LMR*Delicense  -0.07  -0.05  -0.04  -0.10  -0.08  -0.05 
  [0.74]  [0.50]  [0.48]  [1.13]  [0.93]  [0.57] 
LMR*Labor Intensive*Delicense  0.16*  0.16*  0.15*  0.15*  0.16*  0.15* 
  [1.77]  [1.71]  [1.69]  [1.75]  [1.77]  [1.75] 
PMR*Delicense        0.12*     
        [1.81]     
Infrastructure*Delicense          0.12**   
          [2.28]   
Bank credit *Delicense            0.25** 
            [2.38] 
State-Ind FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State-Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Ind-Year FE  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Ind-Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  13257  7540  12728  13257  13257  13257 
Number of state-industry  579  322  550  579  579  579 
R-squared  0.87  0.87  0.88  0.87  0.87  0.87 
Note: Robust t statistics are given in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are clustered by State-Industry pairs in all specifications.  
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Table 6: Labor Market Regulations and Labor Intensive Industries, Robustness 
  I  II  III  IV  V 
  Dependent Variable: Log Real Value Added 
Delicense   -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.06  -0.01 
  [0.11]  [0.08]  [0.02]  [0.92]  [0.29] 
Share S,I in 1980*Delicense  -0.015***  -0.015***  -0.016***  -0.012**  -0.018*** 
  [3.30]  [3.26]  [3.49]  [2.36]  [3.75] 
Initial PCY  in state s*Delicense  0.024***  0.03***  0.02***  0.02**  0.03*** 
  [2.97]  [3.40]  [2.98]  [1.99]  [3.59] 
Labor intensive Industry*Delicense  -0.18**  -0.19***  -5.9***  -6.82  -5.7*** 
  [2.57]  [2.73]  [2.85]  [1.55]  [2.74] 
LMR*Delicense  -0.07  0.07  -0.07  -0.05  -0.04 
  [0.74]  [0.74]  [0.77]  [0.54]  [0.49] 
LMR*Labor Intensive*Delicense  0.16*  0.15*  0.22**  0.22*  0.21** 
  [1.77]  [1.71]  [2.34]  [1.95]  [2.22] 
Infrastructure Industry*Delicense    -0.12*       
    [1.71]       
LMR* Infrastructure Industry*Delicense    -0.22***       
    [2.82]       
PCY*Labor Intensity*Delicense      0.67***  0.77  0.64*** 
      [2.77]  [1.51]  [2.65] 
State-Ind FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State-Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Ind-Year FE  No  No  No  No  No 
Ind-Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  13257  13257  13257  7540  12728 
Number of state-industry  579  579  579  322  550 
R-squared  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.88 
Note: Robust t statistics are given in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are clustered by State-Industry pairs in all specifications.  
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Table 7: Labor Market regulations and Employment 
  I  II  III  IV  V 
  Dependent Variable: Log Employment 
Delicense  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
  [1.30]  [1.26]  [1.25]  [1.27]  [1.25] 
Share state in industry in 1980*Delicense  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  [0.19]  [0.33]  [0.24]  [0.31]  [0.18] 
Initial PCY in state s*delicense  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01 
  [1.16]  [1.20]  [1.01]  [0.62]  [1.54] 
Gross Value Added (log)  0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.45*** 
  [29.9]  [29.9]  [29.9]  [29.9]  [29.8] 
LMR*delicense  0.09**  0.08**  0.08**  0.09**  0.08** 
  [2.45]  [2.26]  [2.34]  [2.50]  [2.26] 
PMR*delicense  0.03       
    [1.02]       
Physical infrastructure*delicense      0.02     
      [1.22]     
Bank Credit *delicense      0.03   
        [0.78]   
Labor intensive Industry *delicense      -0.04 
          [1.18] 
LMR*Labor Intensive*delicense        0.01 
          [0.22] 
State-Ind FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State-Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Ind-Year FE  No  No  No  No  No 
Ind-Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  13257  13257  13257  13257  13257 
Number of state-industry  579  579  579  579  579 
R-squared  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.92 
Note: Robust t statistics are given in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors are clustered by State-Industry pairs in all specifications.  
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